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Abstract We have previously tried to explain perceptual
inference and learning under a free-energy principle that pur-
sues Helmholtz’s agenda to understand the brain in terms of
energy minimization. It is fairly easy to show that making
inferences about the causes of sensory data can be cast as
the minimization of a free-energy bound on the likelihood
of sensory inputs, given an internal model of how they were
caused. In this article, we consider what would happen if
the data themselves were sampled to minimize this bound.
It transpires that the ensuing active sampling or inference is
mandated by ergodic arguments based on the very existence
of adaptive agents. Furthermore, it accounts for many aspects
of motor behavior; from retinal stabilization to goal-seeking.
In particular, it suggests that motor control can be under-
stood as fulfilling prior expectations about proprioceptive
The free-energy principle is an attempt to explain the structure and
function of the brain, starting from the fact that we exist: This fact
places constraints on our interactions with the world, which have been
studied for years in evolutionary biology and systems theory. However,
recent advances in statistical physics and machine learning point to a
simple scheme that enables biological systems to comply with these
constraints. If one looks at the brain as implementing this scheme
(minimizing a free-energy bound on disorder), then many aspects of
its anatomy and physiology start to make sense. In this article, we
show that free-energy can be reduced by selectively sampling sensory
inputs. This leads to adaptive responses and provides a new view of
how movement control might work in the brain. The main conclusion
is that we only need to have expectations about the sensory
consequences of moving in order to elicit movement. This means we
that can replace the notion of desired movements with expected
movements and understand action in terms of perceptual expectations.
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sensations. This formulation can explain why adaptive
behavior emerges in biological agents and suggests a sim-
ple alternative to optimal control theory. We illustrate these
points using simulations of oculomotor control and then
apply to same principles to cued and goal-directed move-
ments. In short, the free-energy formulation may provide an
alternative perspective on the motor control that places it in
an intimate relationship with perception.
Keywords Computational · Motor · Control · Bayesian ·
Hierarchical · Priors
List of symbols
 ⊇ {x˜, v˜, θ , γ }, Unknown causes of sensory
 ⊇ {x˜, v˜, θ, γ } input; variables in bold denote
true values and those in italics
denote variables assumed by
the agent or model
x˜(t) = [x, x ′, x ′′, . . .]T , Generalised hidden-states that
˙˜x(t) = f (x˜, v˜, θ) + w˜ act on an agent. These are
time-varying quantities that
include all high-order temporal
derivatives; they represent a
point in generalised coordi-
nates of motion that encodes
a path or trajectory
v˜(t) = [v, v′, v′′, . . .]T Generalised forces or causal
states that act on hidden
states
s˜(t) = g(x˜, v˜, θ) + z˜ Generalised sensory states
caused by hidden states
θ ⊇ {θ1, θ2, . . .} Parameters of the equa-
tions of motion and sen-
sory mapping
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γ ⊇ {γ s, γ x , γ v} Parameters of the preci-
sion of random fluctuations
(γ i ) : i ∈ s, x, v
w˜(t) = [w,w′, w′′, . . .]T Generalised random fluctua-
tions of the motion of hid-
den states
z˜(t) = [z, z′, z′′, . . .]T Generalised random fluctua-
tions of sensory states
n˜(t) = [n, n′, n′′, . . .]T Generalised random fluctua-
tions of causal states
i := (γ i ) = (γ i )−1 Precisions or inverse covar-
iances of generalised ran-
dom fluctuations
g(x˜, v˜, θ), f(x˜, v˜, a˜, θ) Sensory mapping and equa-
tions of motion generating
sensory states
g(x˜, v˜, θ), f (x˜, v˜, θ) Sensory mapping and equa-
tions of motion modeling
sensory states
a(t) Policy: a scalar function
of generalised sensory and
internal states
p(x˜ |m ), p(s˜ |m ) Ensemble densities; the den-
sity of the hidden and sen-
sory states of agents at equi-
librium with their environ-
ment.
D(q||p) = 〈ln(q/p)〉q Kullback-Leibler divergence
or cross-entropy between
two densities
〈〉q Expectation or mean of under
the density q
m Model or agent; entailing the
form of a generative model
H(X) = 〈ln p(x˜|m)〉p Entropy of generalised hid-
den and sensory statesH(S) = 〈ln p(s˜|m)〉p
− ln p(s˜|m) Surprise or self-information
of generalised sensory
states
F(s˜, µ) ≥ − ln p(s˜|m) Free-energy bound on sur-
prise
q(|µ) Recognition density on
causes  with sufficient
statistics µ
µ = {µ˜(t), µθ , µγ } Conditional or posterior
µ˜ = {µ˜x , µ˜v} expectation of the causes
; these are the sufficient
statistics of the Gaussian
recognition density
η˜(t) = [η, η′, η′′, . . .]T Prior expectation of general-
ised causal states





ε˜s = s˜ − g(µ)
ε˜x = Dµ˜x − f (µ)
ε˜v = µ˜v − η˜
⎤
⎦ Generalised prediction error
on sensory states, the
motion of hidden states and
forces or causal states.
1 Introduction
This article looks at motor control from the point of view of
perception; namely, the fitting or inversion of internal mod-
els of sensory data by the brain. Critically, the nature of this
inversion lends itself to a relatively simple neural network
implementation that shares many formal similarities with real
cortical hierarchies in the brain. The idea that the brain uses
hierarchical inference has been established for years (Mum-
ford 1992; Rao and Ballard 1998; Friston 2005; Friston et
al. 2006) and provides a nice explanation for the hierarchi-
cal organization of cortical systems. Critically, hierarchical
inference can be formulated as a minimization of free-energy;
where free-energy bounds the surprise inherent in sensory
data, under a model of how those data were caused. This
leads to the free-energy principle, which says that everything
in the brain should change to minimize free-energy. We will
see below that free-energy can be minimized by changing
perceptual representations so that they approximate a poster-
ior or conditional density on the causes of sensations. In short,
the free-energy principle entails the Bayesian brain hypoth-
esis (Knill and Pouget 2004; Ballard et al. 1983; Dayan et al.
1995; Lee and Mumford 2003; Rao and Ballard 1998; Friston
2005; Friston and Stephan 2007). However, the free-energy
principle goes further than this. It suggests that our actions
should also minimize free-energy (Friston et al. 2006): We
are open systems in exchange with the environment; the envi-
ronment acts on us to produce sensory impressions, and we
act on the environment to change its states. This exchange
rests upon sensory and effector organs (like photoreceptors
and oculomotor muscles). If we change the environment or
our relationship to it, then sensory input changes. Therefore,
action can reduce free-energy by changing the sensory input
predicted, while perception reduces free-energy by changing
predictions. In this article, we focus in the implications of
suppressing free-energy through action or behavior.
Traditionally, the optimization of behavior is formulated
as maximizing value or expected reward (Rescorla and Wag-
ner 1972; Sutton and Barto 1981). This theme is seen
in cognitive psychology, in reinforcement learning models
(Rescorla and Wagner 1972); in computational neuroscience
and machine-learning as variants of dynamic programming,
such as temporal difference learning (Sutton and Barto 1981;
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Watkins and Dayan 1992; Friston et al. 1994; Daw and Doya
2006), and in behavioral economics as expected utility theory
(Camerer 2003). In computational motor control (Wolpert
and Miall 1996; Todorov and Jordan 2002; Todorov 2006;
Shadmehr and Krakauer 2008), it appears in the form of
optimal control theory. In all these treatments, the problem of
optimizing behavior is reduced to optimizing value (or, con-
versely, minimizing expected loss or cost). Effectively, this
prescribes an optimal control policy in terms of the value that
would be expected by pursuing that policy.
Our studies suggest that maximizing value may represent
a slight misdirection in explaining adaptive behavior, because
the same behaviors emerge in agents that minimize free-
energy (Friston et al. 2009). In brief, the minimization of free-
energy provides a principled basis for understanding both
action and perception, which replaces the optimal polices of
control theory with prior expectations about the trajectory of
an agent’s states. In Sect. 2, we review the free-energy princi-
ple and active inference. In Sect. 3, we show how active infer-
ence can be used to model reflexive and intentional behavior.
This section deals with visual and proprioceptive models to
demonstrate the key role of prior expectations in prescribing
movement. In Sect. 4, we consider the integration of visual
and proprioceptive signals in finessing the control of cued
reaching movements. Section 5 addresses how these prior
expectations could be learned and illustrates the acquisition
of goal-directed movements using the mountain-car problem
(Sutton 1996; see also Friston et al. 2009). Section 6 revisits
the learning of priors to prescribe autonomous behavior. We
conclude by discussing the relationship between active infer-
ence and conventional treatments of computational motor
control.
2 The free-energy principle
In this section, we try to establish the basic motivation for
minimizing free-energy. This section rehearses material that
we have used previously to understand perception. It is pre-
sented here with a special focus how action maintains a sta-
tionary relationship with the environment; and is developed
more formally than in previous descriptions (e.g., Friston and
Stephan 2007). The arguments for how perception decreases
free-energy can be found in the neurobiological (Friston et al.
2006; Friston 2008) and technical (Friston et al. 2008) litera-
ture. These arguments are reviewed briefly but only to a depth
that is sufficient to understand the simulations in subsequent
sections.
What is free-energy? In statistics and machine learning,
free-energy is an information theory quantity that bounds the
evidence for a model of data (Hinton and von Camp 1993;
MacKay 1995; Neal and Hinton 1998). Here, the data are
sensory inputs, and the model is encoded by the brain. More
precisely, free-energy is greater than the surprise (negative
log-probability) of some data, given a model of how those
data were generated. In fact, under simplifying assumptions
(see below), it is just the amount of prediction error. It is
called free-energy because of formal similarities with ther-
modynamic free-energy in statistical physics; where energies
are just negative log-probabilities (surprise) and free-energy
is a bound on surprise. In what follows, we describe the nature
of free-energy, and show why it is minimized by adaptive
agents.
We start with the premise that adaptive agents or pheno-
types must occupy a limited repertoire of physical states. For
a phenotype to exist, it must possess defining characteristics
or traits; both in terms of its morphology and exchange with
the environment. These traits essentially limit the agent to
a bounded region in the space of all states it could be in.
Once outside these bounds, it ceases to possess that trait (cf.,
a fish out of water). This speaks to self-organized autopoi-
etic interactions with the world that ensure these bounds are
respected (cf., Maturana and Varela 1972). Later, we for-
malize this notion in terms of the entropy or average sur-
prise associated with a probability distribution on the states
an agent experiences. The basic idea is that adaptive agents
must occupy a compact and bounded part of state–space and,
therefore, avoid surprising states (cf., a fish out of water—
sic). In terms of dynamical system theory, this set of states
is a random attractor (Crauel and Flandoli 1994). Given this
defining attribute of adaptive agents, we will look at how
agents might minimize surprise and then consider what this
means, in terms of their action and perception.
The free-energy principle rests on an ensemble density
p(x˜|m) on generalized states, x˜(t) = [x, x′, x′′, . . .]T , which
affect an agent, m. Generalized states cover position, veloc-
ity, acceleration, jerk, and so on (Friston 2008). This means
that states include the position or configuration of the agent,
its motion, and all influences acting on the agent: i.e., phys-
ical forces like gravity; thermodynamic states like ambient
temperature, or physiological states such as hypoglycemia.
Strictly speaking; the dimensionality of generalized states is
infinite because the generalized motion of each state exists
to infinite order. However, in practice one can ignore high-
order temporal derivatives because their precision vanishes
and they contain no useful information (i.e., their disper-
sion gets very large; see Friston 2008; Friston et al. 2008 for
details). In the simulations below, we only used generalized
states up to sixth order. In what follows, x(t) refers to a state
vector and x˜(t) denotes the corresponding generalized state
(i.e., the state and its generalized motion). Note that the den-
sity p(x˜|m) is conditioned on the agent or model. We will see
later that the model entails formal constraints on the motion
of an agent’s states (i.e., its state-transitions or policy). This
means the ensemble density is specific to each class of agent.
The ensemble density can be regarded as the probabil-
ity of finding an agent in a particular state, when observed
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on multiple occasions or, equivalently, the density of a large
ensemble of agents at equilibrium with their environment.
Critically, for an agent to exist, the ensemble density should
have low entropy. This ensures that agents occupy a lim-
ited repertoire of states because a density with low entropy
concentrates its mass in a small subset of state–space (i.e.,
its attractor). This places an important constraint on the
states sampled by an agent; it means agents must some-
how counter the dispersive effects of random forces, which
increase entropy. This increase is a consequence of the fluc-
tuation theorem (Evans 2003), which generalizes the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics and says that the probability of
entropy decreasing vanishes exponentially the longer a sys-
tem is observed. Adaptive agents resist the implicit dispersion
of their states through adaptive behaviors (like eating) that
maintain their milieu within physiological bounds. In sum-
mary, biological agents must resist the natural tendency to
disorder or increasing entropy; but how do they do this?
2.1 Active agents
At this point, we introduce the notion of active agents
(Schweitzer 2003) that sense some states (with sensory
organs) and can change others (with effector organs). We
can describe this exchange with the environment in terms of
sensory states s˜(t) like the activity of photoreceptors, internal
states µ˜(t) such as neuronal activity, and action a(t) encod-
ing peripheral motor control signals. Because agents only
sense external states of the world through a probabilistic map-
ping, they are hidden from the agent. We will, therefore, call
x˜ ∈ X hidden states and assume that they evolve according to
some complicated equations of motion, ˙˜x = f(x˜, a, θ) + w˜,
where w are random fluctuations. We will see examples of
this equation later, where x˜(t) represents the angular posi-
tion and speed of a joint, and θ encodes the elasticity and
viscosity of muscles. We will use an unusual convention in
which true hidden quantities are presented in bold and others
in italics.
Control (e.g., of saccadic eye-movements) is represented
by making the equations of motion a function of action. We
will see below that action depends vicariously on sensory
states and, therefore, constitutes a policy (from the point of
view of optimum control theory). It is this policy that resists
the increasing entropy of hidden states, because the only way
that the agent can change hidden states is through action. We
assume that agents do this by minimizing entropy until the
movement of states toward the agent’s attractor is balanced
by dispersion due to random fluctuations. Sensation (e.g.,
proprioception) can be described with a probabilistic map-
ping s˜ = g(x˜, θ) + z˜ from hidden to sensory states s˜ ∈ S,
where z represents sensory noise. Later, we will see exam-
ples were g(x˜, θ) maps from the trajectory of an object in
the visual field to the activity of photoreceptors. The equa-
tions of motion and sensory mapping are parameterized by
(generally non-overlapping) subsets of some time-invariant
parameters θ .
Under a sensory mapping, the entropy of the hidden states
is bounded by the sensory entropy and a sensory mapping
term, with equality in the absence of sensory noise (see
Appendix 1).
H(X |m) ≤ H(S|m) −
∫
p(x˜|m) ln |∂x˜g|dx˜
s˜ = g(x˜, θ) + z˜
˙˜x = f(x˜, a, θ) + w˜
(1)








The second term depends on the collective sensitivity
|∂x˜g| := det(∂x˜g) of sensory inputs to changes in hidden
states, where ∂x˜g is the derivative of the sensory mapping
with respect to the hidden states. For simplicity, we will
assume that this sensitivity is uniformly high over the ranges
of states considered. This appeals to the principle of max-
imum information transfer (Linsker 1990), which has been
very useful in understanding the emergence of things like
receptive fields (e.g., Olshausen and Field 1996). Under this
simplifying assumption, the second term is constant, and it
is sufficient to minimize sensory entropy to minimize the
entropy of hidden states. This is important because the agent
has access to sensory states but not hidden states. Note that
agents cannot minimize sensory entropy by switching off
sensory channels; they can only act by changing hidden
states, not the sensory mapping per se.
Crucially, because the ensemble density on sensory states
is at equilibrium, it can be interpreted as the proportion of
time a single agent entertains these states (the sojourn time).
This ergodic argument (Anosov 2001) means that the sensory
entropy is the long-term average of the surprise − ln p(s˜|m)







dt ln p(s˜(t)|m) (3)
This means that in order to minimize sensory entropy, one
needs to minimize surprise at all times (i.e., for all successive
sensory samples).
At this point, most (astute) people say “but that means
I should retire to a dark room and cover my ears.” How-
ever, is not quite that simple: Recall that entropy is aver-
age surprise and surprise depends on the agent. This means
that it might be surprising to find an agent in a dark room.
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It helps here to imagine that each class of agent (e.g., spe-
cies) has equations of motion that induce a random attractor
in state–space (more formally, a compact random invariant
set that attracts all trajectories; Crauel and Flandoli 1994).
Entropy decreases with the volume or measure of this set.
However, it is important not to confuse volume with shape
or topological complexity. The attractor could be very com-
plicated and space-filling but occupy a small volume (e.g.,
the states encountered while driving a car with a small mar-
gin of error). In this view, minimizing surprise ensures that
states evolve according to the expected flow, f(x˜, a˜, θ) and
remain in the attractor (e.g., within physiological bounds). In
short, the ensemble and sensory entropy are lower bounded
by a random attractor entailed by an agent’s class. Agents try
to attain this bound by minimizing surprise, while learning
and natural selection may reduce the bound by optimizing the
attractor per se. This means the notion of a “dark room” agent
is a category error; in the sense that “dark room” or any fixed-
point attractors are not invariant under real world dynamics
and, therefore, cannot exist (e.g., at some point, you will
get thirsty). Perhaps the most potent examples of surprise-
reducing dynamics are found in physiology, which can be
understood largely in terms of homeostatic mechanisms that
avoid surprising trajectories of the internal milieu:
The fixity of the milieu supposes a perfection of the
organism such that the external variations are at each
instant compensated for and equilibrated … All of the
vital mechanisms, however varied they may be, have
always one goal, to maintain the uniformity of the con-
ditions of life in the internal environment … The sta-
bility of the internal environment is the condition for
the free and independent life (Bernard 1974).
This is closely related to perspectives on motor control and
sequence learning that “minimize deviations from the desired
state, that is, to minimize disturbances of the homeostasis of
the feedback loop.” See Wörgötter and Porr (2005) for a fuller
discussion. In summary, avoiding surprise is fundamental for
survival and speaks to the basic need of organisms to main-
tain equilibrium within their environment. However, there is
a problem:
2.2 Free-energy, action and perception
The problem faced by real agents is that they cannot quantify
surprise, because this entails marginalizing over the unknown
or hidden causes  ⊃ {x˜, θ} of sensory input that include
time-varying hidden states and time-invariant parameters
− ln p(s˜|m) = − ln
∫
p(s˜, |m)d (4)
However, there is an alternative and elegant solution to
minimizing surprise, which comes from theoretical phys-
ics (Feynman 1972) and machine learning (Hinton and von
Camp 1993; MacKay 1995). This involves minimizing a free-
energy bound on surprise that can be evaluated. Minimizing
this bound implicitly minimizes surprise because the bound
is always greater than surprise. The bound is induced by a rec-
ognition density q(|µ), which is parameterized by its suf-
ficient statistics µ ⊃ µ˜(t) (e.g., mean or covariance). These
sufficient statistics are encoded by the internal states of the
agent (e.g., by neuronal activity and connection strengths).
The recognition density is a slightly mysterious construct
because it is an arbitrary probability density specified by the
internal states of the agent. Its role is to induce free-energy,
which is a function of the internal states and sensory inputs.
We will see below that when this density is optimized to min-
imize free-energy, it becomes the conditional density on the
causes of sensory data. In Bayesian inference, this is known
as the recognition density. In what follows, we summarize
the key ideas behind a large body of study in statistics and
machine learning referred to as ensemble learning or varia-
tional Bayes.
The free-energy bound is constructed by simply augment-
ing surprise with a non-negative divergence between the rec-
ognition density and conditional density p(|s˜, m). This is
described Appendix 2. The resulting expression for free-
energy can be expressed in three ways (with the use of Bayes
rule and simple rearrangements):
• Energy minus entropy
• Divergence plus surprise
• Complexity minus accuracy
Mathematically, these correspond to:
F = −〈ln p(s˜, |m)〉q + 〈ln q(|µ)〉q
= D(q(|µ)||p(|s˜, m)) − ln p (s˜|m)
= D(q(|µ)||p(|m)) − 〈ln p(s˜|, m)〉q
(5)
Here, 〈·〉q means the expectation or mean under the density
q and D(·||·) is the cross-entropy or Kullback–Leibler diver-
gence between two densities. The alternative formulations
in Eq. 5 have some important implications: The first shows
that free-energy is a scalar function of sensory data and the
recognition density at any particular time. This can be evalu-
ated by an agent; provided it has a probabilistic model of the
environment. This model is usually expressed as the product
of a likelihood and prior, p(s˜, |m) = p(s˜|, m)p(|m).
We will see examples of this model later (e.g., the likelihood
model in Eq. 8).
The second formulation shows that minimizing the free-
energy, by changing internal states (i.e., the sufficient sta-
tistics of q(|µ)), reduces the divergence between the
recognition and conditional densities. This makes the
recognition density an approximate conditional density. This
corresponds to Bayesian inference on the causes of sensory
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signals and provides a principled account of perception; i.e.,
the Bayesian brain (Helmholtz 1860/1962; Barlow 1969;
Ballard et al. 1983; Mumford 1992; Dayan et al. 1995; Rao
and Ballard 1998; Lee and Mumford 2003; Knill and Pouget
2004; Kersten et al. 2004; Friston and Stephan 2007; Deneve
2008). Finally, it shows that free-energy is an upper bound
on surprise because the divergence cannot be less than zero:
Optimizing the recognition density makes the free-energy
a tight bound on surprise; when the recognition and condi-
tional densities coincide, free-energy is exactly surprise and
perception is veridical.
The third equality shows that free-energy can be sup-
pressed by action, through its effects on hidden states and
the ensuing sensory signals. The key term here is the accu-
racy term, which is the expected surprise of sensory data
under the recognition density (under Gaussian assumptions,
this is just the amount of sensory prediction error). This
means action will change the motion of sensory states so
that they conform to conditional expectations. This min-
imizes surprise, provided perception makes free-energy a
tight bound on surprise. In short, the free-energy princi-
ple prescribes an optimum perceptual representation and
policy
µ(t)∗ = arg min
µ
F(s˜(t), µ(t))




∂µF(s˜, µ) = 0 ⇒ δµ
T∫
0
dt F(s˜, µ) = 0
∂a F(s˜, µ) = 0 ⇒ δa
T∫
0




This policy reduces to sampling input that is expected
under the recognition density (i.e., sampling selectively what
one expects to experience). In other words, agents must nec-
essarily (if implicitly) make inferences about the causes of
their sensory signals and sample signals that are consistent
with those inferences. Technically, minimizing free-energy
ensures the variation of its path integral, with respect to small
variations in action or internal representations, is zero (see
Eq. 6). This time or path-integral is called Action (not to be
confused with action). Under ergodic assumptions, Action is
an upper bound on sensory entropy (see Eq. 3), which means
optimal action and perception minimize a bound on sensory
surprise and, implicitly, entropy.
The free-energy principle suggests that we should sample
the world to ensure our predictions become a self-fulfilling
prophecy. In this view, perception is enslaved by action to
provide veridical predictions (more formally, to make the
free-energy a tight bound on surprise) that guide active sam-
pling of the sensorium. This active sampling should not
be confused with active learning (Mumford 1992). Active
learning or sequential design tries to harvest data to make
recognition more precise using various criteria, based on
how data inform model parameter estimates; “these crite-
ria depend on the assumption that the hypothesis space is
correct, which may prove to be their main weakness” (Mum-
ford 1992). Under the free-energy formulation, this weakness
becomes the strength; if the environment delivers data that
are consistent with the agent’s model or hypothesis space,
then the agent must be at equilibrium with its environment.
2.3 Summary
In summary, the free-energy principle requires the internal
states of an agent and its action to suppress free-energy.
This corresponds to optimizing a probabilistic model of
how sensations are caused, so that the resulting predic-
tions can guide active sampling of sensory data. The req-
uisite interplay between action and perception (i.e., active
inference) engenders a policy that ensures the hidden states
that act on the agent have low entropy. Put simply, if
you search out things you expect, you will avoid sur-
prises. This recapitulates the notion that “perception and
behavior can interact synergistically, via the environment”
to optimize behavior (Verschure et al. 2003). Indeed, Distrib-
uted Adaptive Control (Verschure and Voegtlin 1998) relates
closely to the free-energy formulation, because it provides an
integrated solution to the acquisition of probabilistic models
and policies. Active inference is an example of self-refer-
enced learning (Maturana and Varela 1972; Porr and Wörgöt-
ter 2003) in which “the actions of the learner influence its own
learning without any valuation process” (Porr and Wörgötter
2003).
In machine learning and statistics, the free-energy is used
as a bound on the log-evidence for a model. This means, given
some data, one can optimize the model to maximize its evi-
dence; i.e., find the model that minimizes the surprise of some
fixed data. The free-energy principle turns this optimization
around and considers that the model (agent) is fixed and the
aim is to minimize surprise by re-sampling the data. This
minimization is mandated by the fact that average surprise is
entropy and agents must have a low entropy ensemble den-
sity. This argument rests on noting that the ensemble density
is formally identical to the marginal likelihood in statistics.
In the analysis of time-series data, one optimizes the model
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with respect to the path integral of free-energy over time (see
Friston 2008): Minimizing free-energy at each point in time
provides a stationary solution for Action (by the fundamental
lemma of variational calculus): this is basically Hamilton’s
principle of stationary Action. All that we are doing here is
noting that Action is a bound on the path-integral of surprise
and, under ergodic assumptions, entropy. This means find-
ing a minimum for Action implicitly finds a minimum for
sensory entropy. It is interesting to note that a tendency to
disorder or the second law of thermodynamics (which applies
only to closed systems) can be resisted by appealing to the
more general tendency of (open) systems to reduce their free-
energy (Gontar 2000; Evans 2003). A related treatment of
self-organization in non-equilibrium systems can be found in
synergetics; where “patterns become functional because they
consume in a most efficient manner the gradients which cause
their evolution” (Tschacher and Haken 2007). Here, these
gradients might be regarded as surprise. This section has tried
to establish the theoretical motivation for free-energy mini-
mization. We now turn to how this might be implemented in
the brain.
3 Active inference
In this section, we unpack the theory above to establish the
nature of processes underlying action and perception. In the
previous section, we saw that optimal action and perception
could be cast as minimizing free-energy and that free-energy
is defined in relation to a probabilistic generative model of
the world. In what follows, we will examine particular forms
of this model, which enable free-energy to be expressed in
terms of prediction errors (the mismatch between observed
sensory signals and those predicted by the model). This leads
to a formulation of action and perception as the suppression of
prediction errors (or surprise). By assuming the minimization
in Eq. 6 is implemented using gradient decent, we can then
write down differential equations that prescribe the dynamics
of action and recognition as functions of prediction error.
In order to see how active inference works, we must first
define an environment and the agent’s model of it. We will
assume that both can be cast as dynamical systems with addi-
tive random effects. For the environment, we have equations
of motion and a sensory mapping that describe the processes
generating sensory data
s˜ = g(x˜, v˜, θ) + z˜
˙˜x = f(x˜, v˜, a, θ) + w˜ (7)
This describes how sensory data are actually generated, while
the agent assumes that these data are generated by the fol-
lowing system:
s˜ = g(x˜, v˜, θ) + z˜
˙˜x = f (x˜, v˜, θ) + w˜
v˜ = η˜ + n˜
(8)
Equation 8 is just a way of expressing a generative model in
terms of equations that have a formal homology with the true
generative process (Eq. 7). In other words, Eq. 8 represents
a parameterized model of sensory input, which becomes a
probabilistic model, if the agent makes some assumptions
about the probability distribution of the random fluctuations
(see below). Note that we have partitioned the hidden states
into those that are autonomous v˜(t) and those that are not
x˜(t) (cf. Eq. 1). The autonomous hidden states (e.g., exoge-
nous forces) allow us to model exogenous perturbations of
the agent’s state. In previous treatments (e.g., Friston et al.
2006; Friston 2005), we have called these casual states. Fur-
thermore, these forces are modeled as mixture of some deter-
ministic prior η˜(t) and random fluctuations n˜(t).
Equations 7 and 8 pertain to the same sensory states and
play a similar role. However, the first is the true stochastic
process generating states, and the second is a probabilistic
model of this process. The equations of motion and sensory
mapping may or may not have the same form, which means
the agent’s model of the world may be different from the real
process generating sensory data. Furthermore, we allow for
a difference between the true unknowns  ⊃ {x˜, v˜, θ} and
those assumed by the model  ⊃ {x˜, v˜, θ}.
Gaussian assumptions about the random fluctuations
{z˜, w˜, n˜} in Eq. 8 furnish three things; a likelihood model,
p(s˜|) = N (g, (γ s)), empirical priors on the general-
ized motion p(x˜ ′|v˜, ) = N ( f, (γ x )), and priors on the
forces, p(v˜) = N (η˜, (γ v)). Here, the inverse variances or
precisions  ⊃ γ i : i ∈ s, x, v determine the covariance
(γ i ) of the generalized fluctuations. Note that the equa-
tions of motion for the true states depend on action, whereas
the generative model has no notion of action; it just produces
predictions that action tries to fulfill. However, the generative
model contains a prior on exogenous forces, which, as we will
see later, can be used to model the effects of action. Equa-
tion 8 is a simple hierarchical dynamic model in generalized
coordinates of motion. This sort of model is considered in
detail in Friston (2008). Recall that the equations generating
data (Eq. 7) and those of the generative model (Eq. 8) do not
have to be the same; it is this discrepancy that action tries to
cancel.
Given a probabilistic generative model, the free-energy
can now be minimized: This minimization obliges the agent
to infer the states of the world and learn the unknown
parameters responsible for its motion by optimizing the
sufficient statistics of its recognition density. This is per-
ceptual inference and learning and can be implemented
in a biologically plausible fashion as described in Friston
(2008). In brief, this scheme assumes that a mean-field
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approximation: q(|µ) = q(x˜, v˜|µ˜)q(θ |µθ)q(γ |µγ ) with
Gaussian marginals, whose sufficient statistics are expec-
tations and covariances. Under this Gaussian or Laplace
approximation, it is sufficient to optimize the expectations
because the covariances can be derived as a function of the
expectations. From now on, we assume that the sufficient
statistics are the conditional expectations of states, parame-
ters, and precisions, µ = {µ˜, µθ , µγ }, where the conditional
expectations of states µ˜(t) = {µ˜x , µ˜v} are in generalized
coordinates of motion. Using these (mean-field and Laplace)
approximations, we can formulate Eq. 6 as a gradient descent
that describes perceptual inference, learning, and action (see
Friston et al. 2008; Friston 2008 for details):
˙˜µx = Dµ˜x − ∂F
∂µ˜x




˙˜µv = Dµ˜v − ∂F
∂µ˜v
























This equation is used in all the simulations of active infer-
ence described later. It has a simple form because the free-
energy in Eq. 5 reduces (effectively) to a sum of squared
errors because of our Gaussian assumptions about the ran-
dom fluctuations. The approximate equalities in Eq. 9 are due
to the fact that we are neglecting mean-field terms (and retain
only terms that depend on conditional expectations). The
derivative operator D is a block matrix with identity matri-
ces along the first diagonal such that x˜ ′ := [x ′, x ′′, . . .]T =
D[x, x ′, . . .]T = Dx˜ . The first pair of equations prescribes
recognition dynamics, in terms of how expected states change
over time. The second terms in these equations are free-
energy gradients. The first terms reflect the fact that we
are working in generalized coordinates; they ensure that
˙˜µ = Dµ˜ ⇒ ∂µ˜F = 0 when free-energy is minimized and
its gradient is zero (i.e., they ensure the motion of the expec-
tation is the expected motion). This scheme can be imple-
mented in a biologically plausible manner by assuming that
the activity of one population of neurons encodes the con-





ε˜s = s˜ − g(µ)
ε˜x = Dµ˜x − f (µ)
ε˜v = µ˜v − η˜
⎤
⎦ (10)
The prediction errors ε˜(t) are just the difference between
sensory samples (resp. expected motion of hidden states)
and the predictions afforded by the sensory mapping (resp.
equations of motion) evaluated with the expected states and
parameters. The matrix (µγ ) is the expected precision
(inverse covariance) of the random effects and effectively
boosts prediction errors in proportion to their precision (see
Friston 2008 for more details). Note that under the Laplace
assumption, minimizing free-energy corresponds to mini-
mizing prediction error. This sort of scheme is also called
predictive coding (Rao and Ballard 1998). Figure 2a shows
a schematic of the neuronal circuits that might implement
predictive coding of this sort. These circuits comprise neu-
ronal state-units or populations (white) that encode sensory
input and the conditional expectations of hidden states caus-
ing that input. Error-units are shown in red and encode the
prediction error for their corresponding state-unit. The dot-
ted lines are connections that are intrinsic to the model, and
solid lines represent coupling between action-units (black)
and effectors. The red lines convey prediction errors to the
state (and action) units, while the black lines pass predictions
to the error-units (and effectors). See, Friston (2008), for a
fuller description of the implicit message-passing scheme.
The solutions to the third line in Eq. 9 are the optimum
parameters that may be encoded in the brain with synaptic
efficiency (Friston 2008). These are second-order differential
equations because these expectations optimize Action (the
path-integral of free-energy), due to the fact we know a pri-
ori, that they do not change with time. The resulting changes
in synaptic efficacy are formally identical to Hebbian or asso-
ciative plasticity (under some simplifying assumptions; see
Friston 2008 for details). The final equation describes action
as a gradient descent on free-energy. The only way action can
affect free-energy is through changing the motion of sensory
signals. This means action must suppress sensory prediction
errors, ε˜s = s˜(a)−g(µ). Equation 9 embodies a nice conver-
gence of action and perception: perception tries to suppress
prediction error by adjusting expectations to furnish better
predictions of signals, while action tries to fulfil these pre-
dictions by changing those signals.
3.1 Motor control and prediction errors
Optimal behavior is a powerful guide for understanding
motor control. The notion of forward or generative models
has been established in this field for decades (Wolpert et al.
1995). Some have even used forward motor models to moti-
vate generative models in perception (Kawato et al. 1993).
Usually, forward models in the motor control literature are
used to finesse control, given motor commands prescribing
a desired movement trajectory (see Sect. 7). The free-energy
formulation offers a simpler view; prediction errors are not
there to finesse motor signals; they are the motor signals.
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In other words, there are no top-down motor commands; just
prior expectations about proprioceptive input that are fulfilled
at the spinal level, given a compliant environment and motor
plant (see Fig. 1). In this view, the central nervous system is
not divided into motor and sensory systems but is one percep-
tual inference machine that provides predictions of optimal
action, in terms of its expected consequences. This formula-
tion also specifies what movement kinetics should optimize;
the only thing that action can affect is the prediction error at
the sensory level. This means action can only suppress the
weighted sensory prediction error variance, ε˜Ts ξs = ε˜Ts s ε˜s .
In generalized coordinates, these include prediction errors on
displacement, velocity, acceleration, jerk, etc. This ensures
smooth trajectories, because the variance of higher tempo-
ral derivatives measures the smoothness of trajectories. The
relative weighting of these error variances is controlled by
the optimized precision. This mixture of weighted error var-
iance is related formally to phenomenological cost functions
proposed to account for movement trajectories (cf. Todorov
and Jordan 1998; Nakano et al. 1999; Berret et al. 2008).
3.2 Summary
In this section, we have seen that minimizing free-energy
with respect to neuronal activity encoding the recognition
density can be formulated as a gradient decent. This leads
to recognition dynamics that suppress prediction error, mak-
ing them formally equivalent to predictive coding. Policies
are prescribed in exactly the same way; however, action can
only affect prediction error at the sensory level. This suggests
that sensory prediction errors generate motor command sig-
nals and predicts an intimate anatomical relationship between
primary motor and sensory systems. This is because motor
commands must emanate from sensory systems responsi-
ble for processing the proprioceptive consequences of move-
ment. Empirically, this is seen at cortical, subcortical, and
spinal levels. For example, the primary motor and sensory
cortex lie next to each other in the central sulcus and are
strongly interconnected (Huffman and Krubitzer 2001). At
a subcortical level, the superior colliculus provides a site of
convergence for sensory information (through direct projec-
tions from the retina) and predictions (from visual, parie-
tal, and frontal cortex to the intermediate and deep layers).
Neuronal discharges in deep layers, that initiate saccades,
define motor-fields that coincide with visual receptive fields
in superficial layers (Andersen 1989). Finally, at the spinal
level, the ventral (motor) and dorsal horn (proprioceptive)
are juxtaposed (see Fig. 1).
In summary, under active inference, perception tries to
explain away prediction errors by changing predictions,
while action tries to explain them away by changing the sig-
nals being predicted. This formulation suggests that motor
control may not be the selection of an action but an emergent
property of predictive coding, where proprioceptive predic-
tion errors are quenched by movement. In the next section,
we use the recognition dynamics above and see what sorts of
behavior emerge under active inference.
4 Simulations
4.1 Oculomotor control
In this section, we illustrate active inference using a series of
simple simulations of oculomotor control. These simulations
assume that the agent has already learned the parameters that
optimize its inference about sensory states. We use these sim-
ulations to focus on the nature of active inference and show
how it can lead to phenomena like retinal stabilization, ori-
entating responses, and pursuit movements. We then use the
same model to illustrate how active inference can lead to
intentional behavior that is prescribed by prior expectations
about sensory input.
4.1.1 Retinal stabilization and oculomotor reflexes
Here, we use a linear state–space model and a nonlinear sen-
sory mapping to generate high-dimensional sensory data. We
use the same model as a generative model for active inference
and explore the consequences of action under perturbation.
In this model, a single force perturbs the dynamics of two
hidden states to produce a damped transient. These states
control the location of object (a Gabor patch) in retinotop-
ic space. For simplicity, these states cause the eye to move
(as opposed to the object). Sensory signals are sampled by
photoreceptors on a sparse grid rectangular. The equations
of motion are linear and parameterized in such a way that the
perturbing force causes displacement in one direction. This
displacement is then communicated to the other direction,
to induce elliptical motion of the visual target. The sensory
mapping, on the other hand, is a highly nonlinear function
of the hidden states (direction of gaze or stimulus location)
because the visual stimulus has a nonlinear contrast profile.
We will use this system to ask what would happen under
different prior expectations about stimulus movement. This
generative process and model are given by Eqs. 7 and 8 where
g(x)i j = υ
(
i − 34 x1 − N2
)
υ
( j − 34 x2 − N2
)
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Fig. 1 Schematic detailing the
components of the motor reflex
arc and how it might minimize
sensory prediction error
(free-energy) through action.
The basic idea here is that the
central nervous system provides
predictions about the expected
(proprioceptive) consequences
of movements, which action is
enslaved to fulfill. In the context
of sensorimotor reflexes, motor
signals emitted by ventral
efferents of the spinal cord try to
suppress prediction errors
induced by an unexpected firing
of stretch-receptors. However,
from the point of view of the
motor neurons, this prediction
error could also have been
mediated by a top-down
suppression of predicted
stretch-receptor discharge rates.
In short, sensory prediction











prediction From reflexes to action




dorsal horn dorsal root
ventral root ventral horn
ξ
These equations, which specify the nature of the environment
and model, are used to simulate environmental dynamics
and the agent’s responses. This entails integrating the sto-
chastic differential equation 7 (to evaluate the environment’s
states) and the ordinary differential equation 9 (to evaluate
the agent’s states). See Appendix 3 for details of the integra-
tion scheme. Note that these equations are specified in terms
of states. The corresponding equations for generalized states
are derived easily using the chain rule (see Friston 2008; Eqs.
1 and 2).
In this example, a force or cause v(t) excites changes in
the hidden states through the equations of motion, f(x). The
hidden states (stimulus location in two dimensions) are then
mapped to sensory data and delivered to the agent, using state
and observation noise with log-precisions (inverse variances)
of four and eight respectively. A log-precision of four means
that the standard deviation is exp(−4/2) = 0.135. In all the
simulations below, we used relatively smooth noise for both
the generative process and model. This smoothness is con-
trolled by the precision of its higher derivatives, which were
chosen to give a Gaussian autocorrelation function with a
standard deviation of one half of a simulated time bin (usu-
ally 1/32 s). In this example, the sensory data are a nonlinear
function of stimulus location, generating 6×6 = 36 channels
of data. These functions can be thought of as receptive fields
that map the retinotopic location of the stimulus to the pattern
of excitation, g(x)i j in an N × N array of sensory receptors
(see Fig. 2), where i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . N } : N = 6.
The agent then infers the hidden states (i.e., stimulus loca-
tion) by optimizing the sufficient statistics of its recognition
density, as described in the previous section (Eq. 9). The only
extra thing that we need to consider here is action, a(t), which
is part of the generative process but not part of the genera-
tive model. The only way that action can change free-energy
is by re-sampling sensory data to reduce sensory prediction
error. From Eq. 9, we can see that this just depends on sen-
sory prediction error and the changes in sensory signals with
action. Appendix 3 provides more details about the ensuing
dynamics for the interested reader.
Here, we have deliberately chosen to put action in oppo-
sition to the force, so that the agent can oppose perturbations
to its hidden states. By manipulating its prior expectations on
these perturbations, v(t), we can elicit very different behav-
iors from the agent. This is because the action is used to
explain away prediction error, and prediction error depends
upon the agent’s prior expectations. For example, if we
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sensory prediction and rerro hidden states (location)
perturbation and action
Active inference under flat priors
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Fig. 2 a Schematic showing the relationship of the generative model
(lower panel) to the generative process modeling oculomotor sampling
of the world. The schematic of the generative model used by the brain
comprises state-units or populations (white) that encode sensory input
and the conditional expectations of hidden states causing that input.
Error-units are shown in red and encode the prediction error for their
corresponding state-unit. The dotted lines are connections that are
intrinsic to the model, and solid lines represent coupling between action-
units (black) and effectors. The red lines convey prediction errors to
the state (and action) units, while the black lines pass predictions to
the error-units (and effectors). Please see Friston et al. (2008) for a
fuller description of the scheme implied by these circuit diagrams. In
this example, action causes eye movements which change the visual
information sampled by an array of photoreceptors (top panel). The
locations of these receptors are shown by the white dots, superim-
posed on the Gabor patch-like stimulus. Here, the states of the world
are the direction of gaze in two dimensions. b Upper left These are
the predicted sensory states and corresponding prediction error (red
lines); they represent the predicted sensory input over the 36 photo-
receptor channels induced by motion of the Gabor patch on the left.
This rather complicated set of transients is the prediction based on a
simple elliptical movement of the stimulus described by the expected
hidden states. Upper right The expected hidden states causing sensory
predictions. These can be thought of as vertical and horizontal displace-
ments in retinotopic space. The colored lines correspond to conditional
expectations, and the dashed gray lines to true values (superimposed in
this example). The gray regions correspond to 90% confidence inter-
vals based on the conditional covariance. Lower left The true (dotted
line) and conditional expectation (solid line) of the exogenous cause; a
Gaussian bump function of peristimulus time. In this example, the prior
was zero with a large prior variance. The conditional expectation con-
forms roughly to the true perturbation. Lower right Action (solid line)
and true cause (dotted line). In this instance, action does not change
very much because it is not needed to explain away prediction error.
This is because a priori the agent expects perturbations of unspecified
amplitude
induce a damped elliptical motion in the target, the agent will
sample the stimulus differently, depending upon whether it
expects the stimulus to move or not.
We first examined the responses of the agent under flat or
uninformative priors on the force. These priors were imple-
mented by making the agent expect large amplitude random
fluctuations (with a log-precision of ln µvγ = −16) about
the prior mean η(t) = 0. This simply means that, a priori,
forces can be very large or small and the prior distribution is
very wide (i.e. flat). Under these priors, we would expect the
force and consequent motion to be perceived, because there
are no constraints on whether perturbations should be large or
small. Consequently, we would expect the perceived location
to change as it would in the absence of active sampling. The
results in Fig. 2 show this to be the case. Here, we perturbed
the system with a Gaussian bump function of peristimulus
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sensory prediction and error hidden states (location)
cause (perturbing force) perturbation and action
Active inference under tight priors
(no movement or percept)











































Fig. 3 As per the previous figure but now using informative priors on
the cause. These priors are induced by increasing the conditional log-
precision of random fluctuations in the cause; indicated by thick red line
in the lower panel of a. The ensuing priors drive action to explain away
prediction error. In this instance, action mirrors the real cause (circled
region in the lower right panel of b, so that their respective influences
cancel and there is an attenuation of perceived movement. Note that the
prediction error under these informative priors is larger (red lines). It
is this prediction error that drives action. a This shows the relationship
of the generative model (lower panel) to the generative process mod-
eling oculomotor sampling of the world. b Upper left These are the
predicted sensory states and corresponding prediction error (red lines);
upper right The expected hidden states causing sensory predictions:
The colored lines correspond to conditional expectations, and the gray
regions correspond to 90% confidence intervals. Lower left The true
(dotted line) and conditional expectation (solid line) of the exogenous
cause. Lower right Action (solid line) and true cause (dotted line)
time. It can be seen that the conditional expectation and
true location are roughly the same and that very little action
has been emitted. The results of this simulation should be
compared with those in Fig. 3. Here, we placed tight priors
(ln µvγ = 16) on the force, so that the agent did not expect
any movement of the stimulus that, essentially, it is foveating.
When the stimulus actually moves, the consequent predic-
tion error is explained away by action, and the excursion of
the stimulus is countered almost immediately. The dynamics
of action can be seen in the lower right panel and, as antici-
pated, mirror the exogenous force so that it is opposed almost
exactly. The retinotopic trajectories with flat and informative
priors on exogenous forces are plotted in Fig. 4 for compar-
ison. These show that the excursion of the target has been
completely suppressed by precise expectations (of no pertur-
bations). Note that the only difference between the simula-
tions in Figs. 2 and 3 was that we increased the precision of
the priors on the force, as indicated by the thicker red line
at the bottom of the schematic in Fig. 3. We will return to
the key role of precision in controlling behavior in the next
section.
There are several interesting interpretations of this simple
demonstration: If we consider it in the light of vision, then
action corresponds to saccadic or reflexive eye movements.
Note that the agent can only move its eye in one direction,
although the motor plant entailed by the state equations of
the generative process couple the resulting movements in
both directions. Despite this, it is able to stabilize the image
of the stimulus under active sampling. In other words, the
image is stabilized in accordance with the prior expectation
of no movement. This may provide a nice metaphor for reti-
notopic stabilization through visual and vestibular oculomo-
tor reflexes (Tatler and Wade 2003). Alternatively, we could
consider the action as causing a shift in the sensory frame
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Fig. 4 The stimuli and trajectories with uninformative (Fig. 2) and tight
(Fig. 3) priors: The upper panel details the stimulus or target in sen-
sory space. Middle panels: These are the displacements of the stimulus
perceived under flat and informative priors. The displacement under
tight priors is re-plotted in retinotopic space in the top panel. Note the
shrinkage of the perceived excursion toward the prior expectation of
zero under tight priors (middle right). Lower panels: Action and causes
with (right) and without (left) tight priors. Here, action (solid blue line)
is engaged by informative priors to attenuate the perceived excursion
of the stimulus (dotted green line)
of reference that enables the agent to track a moving target.
This alternative perspective speaks to orientating or tracking
behavior that enables the perception of a moving target as if
it were stationary. Although the target may be moving, the
full extent of this movement is not registered by perception.
This is because the prediction error, under tight priors on
the perturbation, is explained away by action, and action is
not part of the perceptual model. In other words, from the
point of view of the agent, the target is not moving. This
suggests that orientating responses might be understood as
active sampling of the sensorium, which conforms to the
prior expectation that targets do not move. This is a simple
but generic example of the sort of behavior that emerges with
action under the free-energy principle.
4.1.2 Action and intended movements
In the previous simulations, we used an exogenous force with
flat priors to elicit behavior that rendered a moving target
stationary. What would happen if we switched the cause and
priors around? In other words, what would happen if we took
the real cause and used it as a prior expectation but did not
actually move the stimulus? (i.e., if we swapped η(t) and
v(t) in Eq. 11). In this instance, there would be the same
prediction error (with opposite sign) and an active response.
In this case, the prior expectation is that the target is mov-
ing and active sampling will ensure that expectation is met.
This means the agent should saccade away from the target
and then return, once the prior η(t) falls back to zero. The
results in Fig. 5 show an example of this, using a model in
which we replaced the nonlinear sensory mapping to sim-
ulated photoreceptors with a linear mapping to four oculo-
motor proprioceptors (see the schematic on the left). In this
case, action reproduces the prior expectation on the cause to
suppress prediction error (because they play the same role
in the generative process; see Eq. 11). The result is apparent
motion of the stimulus, shown in the upper panels of Fig. 6.
This should be contrasted with the corresponding action in
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Fig. 5 As per Fig. 3 but here the true cause and prior expectation have
been switched: i.e., the prior expectation is a Gaussian bump function,
and the true cause is zero. In this instance, action is in the reverse direc-
tion to fulfill the prior expectation, causing a saccade away from the
target and then back again. The resulting trajectory in retinotopic space
is shown in the next figure. In this example, sensory data were gener-
ated by proprioceptors in the oculomotor system, as opposed to simu-
lated photoreceptors: This is shown schematically in panel (a), which
shows the relationship of the generative model (lower panel) with the
generative process modeling oculomotor sampling of the world.
b Upper left: These are the predicted sensory states and correspond-
ing prediction error (red lines); upper right: The expected hidden states
causing sensory predictions. The colored lines correspond to condi-
tional expectations and the gray regions correspond to 90% confidence
intervals. Lower left: The true (dotted line) and conditional expectation
(solid line) of the exogenous cause. Lower right: Action (solid line) and
true cause (dotted line)
the Fig. 4 where action and forces mirror each other, thereby
canceling to mimic the flat prior.
This example suggests that movements can be induced by
prior expectations of their sensory consequences. In other
words, we only have to expect the sensory consequences of a
movement to make it happen. Prior expectations induce pre-
dictions about what we should be sensing and action automat-
ically moves sensory epithelia to fulfill these predictions. We
are not aware of the movement per se, but register its sen-
sory consequences that are encoded by prior expectations.
In this example, the priors were prescribed by us. In more
realistic hierarchical models, one would imagine that move-
ment-inducing expectations would arise as empirical priors
during inference on a more expansive set of multimodal sen-
sory inputs.
This form of movement specification is a little counter-
intuitive, but has some appealing and biologically plausible
properties. For example, if we only have to specify the con-
sequences of an intended or expected movement, then the
actual action will be robust to variations in the true generative
process or unexpected perturbations to that process. In other
words, specifying a movement in terms of what we want to
see, as opposed to what we want to do, automatically makes
behavior much more robust. In order to illustrate this, we
added an exogenous but late perturbation to the target stimu-
lus during the intended movement. This is a simple metaphor
for empirical studies of movement trajectories under pertur-
bation (e.g., Paulignan et al. 1991; Fourneret and Jeannerod
1998; Liu and Todorov 2007). The resulting inference and
action in Fig. 6 (middle panels) show that action (blue line)
123
Biol Cybern (2010) 102:227–260 241
Fig. 6 These plots show the
trajectory of a perceived
stimulus location (left panels),
under movement induced by
priors and consequent action
(right panels). Upper row: This
corresponds to a movement
elicited by priors, where the
prior expectation is formally
identical to the true cause of the
previous simulations (see
Fig. 3). Middle row: These are
the results of a simulation where
a small exogenous perturbing
force was applied late in the
movement trajectory (arrow in
right panel). The impact on the
trajectory is almost
imperceptible (arrow in left
panel). In this instance, action
has compensated for the
unanticipated perturbation.
Lower row: Here, we doubled
the sensitivity of the motor plant
to command signals or action.
Note that action has
automatically compensated for
this change and that the ensuing
trajectory, as perceived, has not


















































explains away the unexpected perturbation with relatively
little impact on the percept (green line). This means that the
perturbation was automatically discounted in terms of the
movement trajectory. As a final example of the robustness of
movement specification under active sampling, we changed
the motor plant by changing the sensitivity of movement to
action in the generative process; by replacing a → 2a in
Eq. 11. Again, because action is simply minimizing predic-
tion error, this had no effect on the perceived excursion of
the target. As seen in Fig. 6 (lower panels), the only effect
was evident in the amplitude of the action elicited. The agent
does not need to know about this change in the dynamics
of the motor plant because action is effectively exploiting
closed-loop feedback (cf. the equilibrium-point hypothesis
discussed later).
4.1.3 Summary
In these simulations, we have seen how active sampling can
mimic retinal stabilization or visual tracking behavior by
implementing a prior expectation that a visual target is sta-
tionary. Conversely, we can induce movement through action
by invoking prior expectations about movements. Critically,
specifying an action in terms of its sensory consequences
renders action robust to variations in the motor plant or
unexpected exogenous perturbations. This is because action
explains away prediction error, which is prescribed by the
prediction and prior expectations. The simulations in this
section used unimodal (visual or proprioceptive) models. In
the next section, we turn to sensorimotor integration in the
context of multimodal (visual and proprioceptive) inference.
4.2 Sensorimotor integration
In this section, we illustrate the Bayesian integration of pro-
prioceptive and visual signals to optimize computational
motor control of cued reaching movements (Körding and
Wolpert 2004; Disney et al. 2007; Kreisel et al. 2007; Bruyn
and Mason 2009; Diedrichsen and Dowling 2009). This
method highlights the ability of active inference to explain
multimodal integration in perception: through the conver-
gence of bottom-up sensory prediction errors that optimize
perceptual representations and multimodal integration in
action; through the convergence of top-down sensory predic-
tion error onto motor commands that optimize action. This
bilateral role of prediction errors joins sensory and motor
processing and provides a nice perspective on sensorimotor
integration. Our particular focus here will be the weighting of
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visual and proprioceptive signals to optimize action, which
emerges from the optimization of precision parameters dur-
ing recognition.
The model used in this section involves reaching to a target
using a two joint arm. The proprioceptive input corresponds
to the angle of both joints, (x1, x2), which are the hidden
states, while the visual input is modeled as the position and
brightness of a target and the location of the arm’s extremity.
We will treat the location (v1, v2) and brightness v3 of the
target as autonomous causal states and the location of the arm
as a function of hidden states, J (x). We ignore the complexi-
ties of extracting positional information from retinotopically
mapped visual input and assume that the agent has direct
access to locations of the target and arm in visual space:








The dynamics of the arm conform to Newtonian laws, under
which action forces the angular position of each joint, with
angular inertia, mi . Both joints have an equilibrium posi-
tion at 90 degrees; with elasticity k = [8, 4] and viscosity

































However, the agent’s empirical priors had a very different
form: The agents’ generative model ignores elasticity and
assumes that the arm’s distal extremity accelerates toward
the target when, and only, when the target is illuminated
brightly. This prior expectation is encoded as an expected
force ϕ = v3([v1, v2]T − J (x)) that acts on both joints
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Here, Ji (x) corresponds to the relative position of the i-th
















These priors on the dynamics of the hidden states cause the
arm to reach for the target in a reasonably graceful and plau-
sible way, when the target is brightened. Figure 8 shows a
typical simulation under fairly noisy proprioception. Here,
we modulated the brightness of the target with a Gaussian
bump function. When the target becomes bright the agent
believes its hand is drawn to the target. This belief induces
prediction errors on the generalized angular position (i.e.,
angular force), which action quenches by moving the joints
to comply with prior expectations. Note that sensory predic-
tions are visual and proprioceptive because the generative
model renders both modalities a function of hidden states,
like forces and torques. In other words, not only does the
agent expect to feel a torque but it also expects to see acceler-
ation of its arm. Once the brightness cue has disappeared, the
arm remains on target because the agent’s generative model
does not include elastic forces that would return to the arm
to its resting position. This necessitates persistent action to
resist elastic forces (see lower middle panel of Fig. 8). This
type of control is quite similar to the Passive Motion Para-
digm (Mussa Ivaldi et al. 1988) and the ensuing Kinematic
Network model. This model expresses kinematic transforma-
tions implied by elasticity to regularize the ill-posed problem
that arises from redundancy in motor control.
In this simulation, we used a relatively large amount
of sensory noise on the proprioceptive input (with a log
precision of four), while visual information was relatively
high precision (a log precision of eight). Despite this, the
movement trajectory was remarkably smooth and accurate.
This is because action is driven by both proprioceptive and
visual prediction errors (descending black arrows in Fig. 7).
Although the proprioceptive errors are noisy, the visual errors
are precise and can elaborate accurate predictions of hidden
states (see top left panel of Fig. 8) and precise motor com-
mands. This robustness to proprioceptive noise rests on opti-
mizing the expected precisions in both sensory modalities as
in Eq. 9. The ensuing optimization boosts visual prediction
errors relative to proprioception and ensures that the relative
contribution of both modalities is balanced in a Bayes opti-
mal fashion (for both action and perception). This aspect of
multimodal integration can be illustrated by examining the
expected precisions under factorial manipulations of visual
and proprioceptive noise.
Figure 9 shows the expected precisions for proprioceptive
µ
pro
γ and visual µvisγ modalities and the associated move-
ments under all combinations of low (log precision of eight)
and high (log precision of four) levels of sensory noise. It
can be seen that the estimated precisions are almost exactly
correct for all four combinations. In terms of movement, it
is clear that vision can substitute for proprioception and vice
versa. Only when both modalities are noisy (i.e., imperfect
proprioception and obscuring the arm from sight), then reach-
ing is compromised. This is seen on the lower left, when the
arm flails around erratically, as might be seen in an excited
neonate.
4.2.1 Summary
In this section, we have reiterated the idea that apparently pur-
poseful or intentional movements can be prescribed purely in
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Fig. 7 Schematic of the simulated cued-reaching models. Right: Motor
plant, comprising a two-jointed arm with two degrees of freedom (hid-
den states) corresponding to the angular position of each joint. The
position of the arm’s extremity (red circle) is the sum of the vectors
describing the location of each joint. Here, exogenous causes are the
position and brightness of the target (green circle). The masses (angu-
lar inertia) of the first (shoulder) and second (elbow) joints were four
and two respectably, with viscosity coefficients of eight and four. The
elasticity of both was one quarter. Left: The agent senses the hidden
states directly and indirectly through the position of the finger in visual
space. In addition, visual input includes the causes representing target
location and brightness. Sensory prediction errors are passed to higher
brain levels to optimize the conditional expectations of the hidden states
(angular position of the joints). The ensuing predictions are sent back to
suppress sensory prediction errors. At the same time, sensory prediction
errors are also trying to suppress themselves by changing sensory input
through action. The red lines denote reciprocal message passing among
neuronal populations encoding prediction error and conditional expec-
tations, however, the black lines represent descending motor control
signals from sensory prediction error units. The equations implement
free-energy minimization or recognition, as described in the main text
terms of prior expectations. Here, these priors were encoded
by cue-dependent priors on the generalized motion of hidden
states (angular position) of an agent’s motor plant (a two-joint
arm). These priors are combined with multimodal sensory
evidence to provide predictions, which drive action. Criti-
cally, the evidence from different modalities is integrated in
an optimal way by weighting the ensuing prediction errors by
their optimized precisions. Both recognition and action rest
on prediction errors and their relative weighting. Sensory pre-
diction errors can derive from may modalities and sensory
epithelia. In general, these will converge through hierarchical
message passing to optimize perception and action in a bilat-
eral fashion. In active inference, perception speaks to action
through sensory prediction errors which optimize perception
through their bottom-up effects and optimize action by pro-
jecting down to motor control units in the oculomotor system
and spinal cord.
This section has shown how simple cued movements can
be elaborated by priors under the free-energy principle, with
a special focus on the role precision in optimizing multisen-
sory integration in motor control. In the next section, we show
how autonomous goal-directed movements can be learned by
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Fig. 8 Simulating cued movements: Left conditional expectations of
causal and hidden states using the same format as in Figs. 2, 3, and 5. In
this example, the proprioceptive input was quite noisy (gray lines in the
top left panel); necessarily producing large proprioceptive prediction
errors (red lines in the top left panel). Right: Ensuing movement trajec-
tory caused by action (solid lines in the adjacent lower panel). The red
circles indicate the initial and final position of the arm, which is seen
to reach the target (green circle) reasonably quickly and smoothly. The
black lines show the trajectory of the arm, and the colored lines show
the position vectors at each time step
optimizing the parameters encoding prior expectations about
movement trajectories.
5 Goal-directed behavior
This section deals with the optimization of action or poli-
cies under perceptual learning (cf. Grafton et al. 2008). In
the previous section, we specified the priors that led to cued-
movements. Here, we consider how these priors are learned.
In brief, we will show that quite complicated goal-directed
behaviors can be instilled through supervised learning by
placing an agent in a controlled environment so that it learns
what to expect. When replaced in an uncontrolled or native
environment, the agent seeks out the sensory states that it
has learned to expect. The result is an optimum policy that is
robust to perturbations and constrained only by the agent’s
prior expectations that have been established during training.
A controlled environment can be thought of as one in which
certain behaviors are enforced. In the context of reaching
movements, this control could be exerted by force channels
(e.g., Scheidt et al. 2000; Diedrichsen and Dowling 2009).
The model used in this section is a benchmark example in
dynamic programming: namely, the mountain-car problem.
These simulations have already been reported in Friston et al.
(2009) to illustrate how reinforcement learning can be cast
as free-energy optimization. Here, we reprise the simula-
tions but interpret them in terms of learning a motor policy
that manifests as goal-directed movements. The mountain-
car problem can be envisaged as follows: one has to move
a heavy weight away from the bottom of the well and keep
it there (Fig. 10). However, the weight is too heavy to sim-
ply to push it out of the well. This means that the only way
to move the weight to its desired location is to push it up
one side of the well and use its momentum to get it past the
steepest part of the other side. This represents an interesting
problem, when considered in the state–space of position and
velocity, (x, x ′); the agent has to move away from the target
location (x = 1, x ′ = 0) to attain its goal and execute a
very circuitous movement (cf., avoiding obstacles; Jax and
Rosenbaum 2007). This problem can be specified with the










b(x) − 14 x′ + v + σ(a + c(x˜))
]
b(x) =
{−2x − 1 : x ≤ 0
−x2(1 + 5x2)−3/2 − x4/16 : x > 0
c(x˜) = θ1 + θ2x + θ3x′ + θ4xx + θ5xx′ + θ6x′x′
(16)
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Fig. 9 Reaching under
different levels of sensory noise.
All panels show movement
trajectories using the same
format as in the previous figure.
The inset for each panel shows
the conditional expectations of
the precision (inverse variance
or noise level) of proprioceptive
and visual input. It can be seen
that movement is robust to
noise, unless both modalities
deliver degraded sensory
information. Lower row: Noisy
proprioceptive (angular joint
position) input. Right column:
Noisy visual information about
the location of the arm (e.g.,
partial occlusion)










































































Fig. 10 Schematic of the
mountain car problem: Left The
landscape or potential energy
function that defines forces on
the weight. This has a minimum
at x = −0.5. The weight is
shown at its uncontrolled stable
position (transparent) and the
target position at the top of the
well on the right at x = 1
(vertical dotted line). Right:
Forces experienced by the
weight at different positions due
to the slope of the well (blue).
Critically, at x = 0, the force is
unity and cannot be overcome
by the agent, due to the
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As above, substitution of these functions into Eq. 7 provides
the equations used to simulate environmental dynamics and
generate sensory data. The first equality means that the agent
has a noisy sense of the weight’s position and velocity. The
second means that the forces on the weight, x˙′(t) have four
components: a gravitational force b(x) = −∂xϕ(x), which is
just the spatial gradient of the potential energy function ϕ(x)
in Fig. 10 (left panel). The remaining three forces are friction
x′/4, an exogenous force v(t), and a controlling force that
is bounded by a squashing (logistic) function: −1 ≤ σ ≤
1. This force comprises action and state-dependent control,
c(x˜). Control is approximated here with a second-order poly-
nomial expansion of any nonlinear function of the states,
whose parameters are θ = {θ1, . . . , θ6}. When θ = 0 the
environment is uncontrolled; otherwise, the weight experi-
ences state-dependent forces that enable control.
In order to create a controlled environment, we simply
optimize the parameters of its equations of motion to max-
imize the probability that the goal is attained. This entails
adjusting the parameters to maximize the ensemble den-
sity, p(x˜|m) at the target location, as described in Friston
et al. (2009). The upper panels of Fig. 11 show the equilib-
rium densities without control (θ = 0; top row) and for the
controlled environment (θ = θQ ; middle row) in which the
goal attracts all trajectories. As anticipated, the trajectories in
Fig. 11 (middle row) move away from the goal initially and
then converge on it. This controlled environment now plays
host to a naïve agent, who must learn its dynamics through
experience.
5.1 Learning






b − 14 x ′ + v + σ(η + c)
] (17)
For simplicity, we assumed that f (x˜, v˜, θ) was the same as
Eq. 16 but without action. The unknown causes in this model,
 ⊇ {x˜, v˜, θ, γ }, comprise the states (position and veloc-
ity), exogenous force, parameters controlling state-depen-
dent acceleration, and precisions of the random fluctuations.
The agent was exposed to 16 trials of 32 s time-bins. Simu-
lated training involved integrating Eqs. 7 and 9 with θ = θQ
(see Appendix 3). On each trial, the weight was “pushed”
with an exogenous force, sampled from a Gaussian density
with a standard deviation of eight. This enforced a limited
exploration of state–space. The agent was aware of these per-
turbations, which entered as priors on the forcing term; i.e.
η˜ = v˜. During learning, we precluded active inference, such
that the agent sensed the trajectory passively, as it left the
target state and returned to it.
Note that the agent does know the true states because
we added a small amount of observation error (with a log-
precision of eight) to form sensory inputs. Furthermore, the
agent’s model allows for random fluctuations on both posi-
tion and velocity. When generating sensory data, we used a
small amount of noise on the motion of the velocity (with a
log-precision of eight). After 16 trials, the parameters con-
verged roughly to the values that were utilized to construct the
control environment. This means that the agent expected the
weight to move along state–space trajectories that converge
on the target. These optimum dynamics have been learned
in terms of empirical priors on the generalized motion of
states encoded by µθ—the expected parameters of the equa-
tions of motion. These expectations are shown in the lower
row of Fig. 11 in terms of the trajectories they encode; i.e.,
f (x˜, v˜, µθ ). It can be seen that the nullclines (lower right)
based on the parameters after training have a similar topology
to the controlled environment (middle right), ensuring that
the fixed-points that have been learnt are the same as those
required to attain the goal. Therefore, what would happen if
the agent was placed in an environment that did not conform
to its expectations?
5.2 Active inference
In order to demonstrate that the agent has learnt the opti-
mum policy, we placed it in an uncontrolled environment; i.e.,
θ = 0, and allowed action to minimize free-energy. We pre-
vented further perceptual learning by fixing the conditional
expectations of the parameters to µθ and the log-precisions to
µxγ = µsγ = 8. An example of active inference after learning
is presented in Fig. 12. Again, this involved integrating envi-
ronmental and recognition dynamics (Eqs. 7, 9), where these
stochastic differential equations are now coupled through
action. The colored lines show the conditional expectations
of the states, while the gray areas represent 90% confidence
intervals. These are tight because we used low levels of noise.
The dotted red line on the upper left corresponds to the pre-
diction error: namely, the discrepancy between the observed
and predicted states. The ensuing trajectory is superimposed
on the nullclines (middle panels) and shows the agent moving
the weight away from its goal initially, to build up the req-
uisite momentum. Once the goal has been attained, action is
still required because, in the uncontrolled environment, it is
not a fixed-point attractor.
In order to illustrate the robustness of this behavior, we
repeated the simulation while applying exogenous forces to
the weight (modeled with a random normal variate smoothed
with a Gaussian kernel of 8 s). Because the agent did
not expect these perturbations, they were explained away
by action and not perceived. Goal-directed behavior was
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Fig. 11 Left panels: Flow-fields and associated equilibrium densities
for an uncontrolled environment (top), a controlled or optimized envi-
ronment (middle), and under prior expectations after learning (bottom).
Notice how the flow of states in the controlled environment enforces
trajectories that start by moving away from the target location at posi-
tion x = 1 (with a small velocity). The red arrows denote the change in
state (position and velocity) prescribed by the parameters: this change
is f (x˜, v˜) evaluated at x3 = 0.5. The ensemble density is the princi-
pal eigenfunction of the Fokker–Plank operator associated with these
parameters. For the controlled and expected environments, these are
low entropy equilibria, concentrated on the target location. Right pan-
els: These panels show the flow fields in terms of their nullclines. Null-
clines correspond to lines in state–space where the rate of change of
one variable is zero. Here, the nullcline for position is along the x-axis,
where velocity is zero. The nullcline for velocity is when the change in
velocity goes from positive (gray) to negative (white). Fixed points cor-
respond to the intersection of these nullclines. It can be seen that in an
uncontrolled environment (top), there is a stable fixed point, where the
velocity nullcline intersects the position nullcline with negative slope.
Under controlled (middle) and expected ( bottom) dynamics, there are
now three fixed points. The rightmost fixed-point is under the maximum
of the ensemble density and is stable. The middle fixed-point is halfway
up the hill, and the final fixed-point is at the bottom. Both of these are
unstable and repel trajectories so that they are ultimately attracted to
the target location. The red lines depict an exemplar trajectory, under
deterministic flow, from x = x ′ = 0. In a controlled environment, this
shows the optimum behavior of moving up the opposite side of the well
to gain momentum so that the target (green dot) can be reached
preserved (lower panels of Fig. 12), with mirror symmetry
between action and the displacing force it counters. Note
that action is greater because it exerts its effects through a
squashing function (see Eq. 16).
5.3 Optimal behavior and conditional precision
Optimal behavior depends on the expected precision of the
hidden state motion encoded by µxγ . In this example, the
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Fig. 12 Top row: The left panel
shows the predicted sensory
states (position in blue and
velocity in green). The red lines
correspond to the prediction
error based on conditional
expectations of the states (right
panel). The associated
conditional covariance is
displayed as 90% confidence
intervals (thin gray areas).
Middle row: The nullclines and
implicit fixed points associated
with the parameters learnt by the
agent, after exposure to a
controlled environment (left).
The actual trajectory through
state–space is shown in blue;
(the red line is the equivalent
trajectory under deterministic
flow). The action causing this
trajectory is shown on the right
and shows a polyphasic
response until the desired
position is reached, after which
a small force is required to stop
the weight sliding back into the
well (see Fig. 10). Bottom row:
As per the middle row but now
in the context of a smoothly
varying perturbation (broken
line in the right panel). Note that
this exogenous force has very
little effect on the navigation of
state–space because it is
unexpected and countered by
action. These simulations used





































































agent was fairly confident about its prior expectations, but
did not discount sensory evidence completely (with log-pre-
cisions of µvγ = µsγ = 8). These conditional precisions
are important quantities, which control the relative influ-
ence of bottom-up sensory information relative to top-down
predictions. In a perceptual setting, they may mediate atten-
tional gain (cf., Abbott et al. 1997; Yu and Dayan 2005; Fris-
ton 2008). In active inference, they also control whether an
action is emitted or not (i.e., motor intention): Increasing
the relative precision of the hidden states causes more con-
fident behavior, whereas reducing it subverts action. This is
because prior expectations are discounted by sensory input
and are, therefore, not expressed at the level of sensory
predictions. In biological formulations of the free-energy
principle, modulatory neurotransmitters might encode the
precision of prior expectations (Friston 2008). In this context,
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Fig. 13 Inferred states, (top row) and trajectories through state–space
(bottom row) under different levels of conditional uncertainty or
expected precision. As in previous figures, the inferred sensory states
(position in blue and velocity in green) are shown with their 90% confi-
dence intervals, and the trajectories are superimposed on nullclines. As
the expected precision falls, the inferred dynamics are less accountable
to prior expectations, which become less potent in generating prediction
errors and action. It is interesting to see that uncertainty about the states
(gray area) increases, as precision falls and confidence is lost
a deficit in dopaminergic neurotransmission would reduce
the operational potency of priors to elicit action and lead to
motor poverty; as seen in Parkinson’s disease, schizophrenia,
and neuroleptic bradykinesia. Through progressively reduc-
ing the expected precision of the empirical priors that have
been instilled during training, we can simulate this poverty.
Figure 13 shows three phases: first a loss of confident behav-
ior, where the agent rocks backward and forward cautiously,
until it has more than sufficient momentum to reach its goal.
Second, a stereotyped behavior (corresponding to a quasipe-
riodic attractor), in which the agent prevaricates at the bottom
of the well (cf., displacement activity, motor stereotypy, or
perseveration). Finally, we get avolitional behavior, where
the agent succumbs to gravity (cf., bradykinesia or psycho-
motor poverty).
5.4 Summary
We have seen that agents can learn causal structure in the
environment and sample it in an adaptive and self-supervised
fashion. This results in behavioral policies that reproduce
those optimized by reinforcement learning and dynamic pro-
gramming. Critically, we do not need to invoke the notion of
reward or value to optimize these behaviors. It is sufficient
to induce prior expectations through perceptual learning that
prescribe goal-directed behavior in an unsupervised setting.
In the previous section, we considered the relative precision
among sensory signals in different modalities. Here, we kept
the sensory precision fixed and changed the precision of prior
expectations. Under active inference, the precision of sensory
information and empirical priors determine their relative con-
tribution to action. In this context, it is interesting to note that
a “mere expectation to move causes attenuation of sensory
signals” (Voss et al. 2008). This is consistent with a relative
increase in the precision and consequent amplitude of predic-
tion errors that mediate empirical priors. In this section, we
focused on goal-directed movements that had a fixed goal or
state. In the final section, we address the learning of behav-
iors that are specified not in terms of goals but in terms of
movement trajectories per se.
6 Learning autonomous behavior
In the previous section, we specified behavior in terms of a
target location in state–space. This is fine if we want agents
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to occupy specific states: i.e., if we want to induce action
with fixed-point attractors. However, real-world behaviors
are dynamic, calling for the optimization of state trajectories
of an autonomous and itinerant nature. In ethology, these
might correspond to a succession of states or sequences of
behaviors that are elicited with high-order operant condi-
tioning paradigms. In optimal control, an exemplar prob-
lem is bipedal walking (Prinz 2006; Manoonpong et al.
2007). Here, we set ourselves the task of instilling behav-
ioral trajectories in an agent that conform to one of the
simplest systems with autonomous dynamics, the Lorenz
attractor.
Using the same procedure as above, we used the follow-
ing generative process and model, whose equations of motion































and initialized the conditional
expectations of the agent toµθ = 0 (with fixed log-precisions
of µsγ = 8 and µxγ = 16). In these simulations, we took the
hidden states to represent the position of an agent (or its arm)
in a three-dimensional (3D) Euclidean space. This means
that the agent moves under control as if it was on a Lorenz
attractor and comes to learn what trajectories to expect. After
16 trials of 512 time-bins (16 × 8 s of real time), the agent
was removed from its controlled environment and examined
for evidence of learning. The upper panels of Fig. 14 show
the ensemble density and flow of the training environment
and a typical 8-s trajectory (upper panels: θ = θQ). The
middle panels show the corresponding expectations of the
agent before (middle panels: θ = 0) and after (lower panels:
θ = µθ ) learning. It can be seen that before learning, the
agent expects to move toward a fixed point attractor; how-
ever, after learning, it expects to navigate its environment as
if it was on a Lorenz attractor.
Figure 15 shows that these expectations are fulfilled by
active inference, when placed in an unsupervised environ-
ment with θ = 0. Critically, the agent’s behavior is impervi-
ous to exogenous perturbations applied to the motion of the
first state (see Eq. 18); this perturbation was modeled with
a random Gaussian time-series smoothed with a Gaussian
kernel with a standard deviation of eight time-bins. Despite
these perturbations, the agent adheres to its concept of a Lor-
enz attractor. As above, the precision with which the agent
recapitulates its learned trajectories rests on a high degree of
confidence in its dynamical priors, assured by high values
of the log-precision, µxγ . Although an almost trivial exam-
ple, this way of prescribing desired trajectories may have
pragmatic applications in engineering and robotics (cf., Prinz
2006; Manoonpong et al. 2007). This is because the trajecto-
ries prescribed under active inference are remarkably robust
to noise and exogenous perturbations.
6.1 Summary
The picture that emerges from these simulations is that an
effective way to instantiate desired movements is to induce
prior expectations through use-dependent plasticity in the
agent’s generative model, so that the expected movements are
reproduced automatically. The resulting priors might be the
basis of hand-path priming effects, in which hand movements
around obstacles induce a significant curvature in the trajec-
tory of the movement trajectories that persists after the obsta-
cle has been removed (Jax and Rosenbaum 2007). Indeed,
most neuro-rehabilitation therapies rely on motor training
and use-dependent plasticity, where the patient is guided in
the reproduction or forced to reproduce desired movements
with the paretic limb. (e.g., Kreisel et al. 2007). Interestingly,
this use-dependent plasticity rests on neuromodulatory trans-
mitter function (Bütefisch et al. 2002) of the sort that may
encode precision (Friston 2008).
Optimizing policies under the free-energy principle is not
limited to policies that are defined in terms of states with
utility. This is because the only things that are required to
teach an agent are exemplar trajectories. Heuristically, this
corresponds to showing the agent what it is like to be optimal
and then letting it fulfill its expectations in an unsupervised
setting. In fact, the only things needed to specify behavior
are the equations of desired motion. In principle, it may be
possible to prescribe desired kinematics, say during walking,
and then let the agent reproduce the associated trajectories
in an uncontrolled environment with random perturbations.
It is easy to imagine the attractor in Fig. 15 being replaced
by more complex and possibly itinerant attractors that have
desired context-sensitive properties and that could be learned
by adaptive agents.
7 Discussion
This article has suggested that active inference is mandated
by population dynamics and may provide a plausible expla-
nation for some aspects of motor behavior. In particular, it
suggests that motor control can be understood as prior expec-
tations about proprioception, which enslave the peripheral
motor system to fulfill them. Furthermore, active inference
provides a mechanistic account of how adaptive behavior
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Fig. 14 The behavior of an
agent that learns to be Lorenz
attractor depicted as in Fig. 11,
in terms of equilibrium densities
(left) and exemplar trajectories
(right). Top panels: Dynamics of
the supervised environment that
offers control of the agent so
that it can experience and learn
desired behavior. Middle panels:
Equivalent characterization of
behavior before training, when
the agent expects to be drawn to
a point attractor. Lower panels:
The same as in the previous row
but after learning, when prior
expectations about the
environment have been
transcribed from the controlled
environment by learning

















































































can emerge and suggests a simple alternative to dynamic
programming or reinforcement learning, when prescribing
desired behaviors. There is a vast literature on motor con-
trol and sensorimotor integration, which addresses a host of
issues in detail, relating theoretical and empirical perspec-
tives. We have only addressed some of these issues super-
ficially, using simple simulations to impart the intuitions
behind active inference. In the next section, we try to high-
light the implications of the ideas presented above for some
established areas of research.
7.1 Active inference and optimal control
Typically, dynamic programming and related approaches in
optimal control theory posit a value-function of every point in
state–space. This is the utility or reward expected under the
current policy and is the solution to the relevant Bellman
equation (Bellman 1952). A policy is then optimized to
ensure that states of high value are visited with greater prob-
ability. In control theory, value acts as a guiding function by
establishing gradients, which the agent can ascend (Bellman
1952; Sutton and Barto 1981; Friston et al. 1994). Similarly,
in discrete models, an optimum policy selects states with
the highest value (Watkins and Dayan 1992; Todorov 2006).
However, under the free-energy principle, there is no value-
function or Bellman equation to solve. The only states that
agents aspire to are those that they expect to frequent.
In brief, active inference replaces optimal polices with
prior expectations about state-transitions (e.g., movement
trajectories). These priors may be acquired (empirical priors)
through learning or may be innate (full priors) and optimized
by natural selection. In the mountain-car example, the prior
expectation (optimal policy) was acquired through learning
the equations of motion of a controlled environment. This
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Fig. 15 The behavior of an
agent that thinks it is a Lorenz
attractor portrayed using the
format in Fig. 2. However, this is
no ordinary attractor; its
trajectories are supported purely
by action (displayed as a
function of time in the lower
right panel). Action tries to
suppress prediction errors on
motion through its three
dimensional state–space (blue
line in lower left panel). These
prediction errors (red line in
upper left panel) are the
difference between sensed and
expected motion based on the
agent’s generative model and
expected hidden states (upper
right panel). Critically, this
autonomous behavior is very
resistant to random forces on the
agent. This can be seen by
noting that the first state has
been perturbed with a smooth
exogenous force (broken blue
line on the lower right). Note
that action counters this
perturbation and the ensuing
trajectories are essentially
unaffected














































can be regarded as a form of supervised learning, because the
environment was supplied by us to instill a particular behav-
ior. In Friston (2010), we show how the same behavior can be
elicited in an unsupervised setting, using prior expectations
that enforce exploration of state–space until states with high
utility are encountered. Similar adaptive behavior emerges
under isotropic sequence order learning in a closed-loop set-
ting (Porr and Wörgötter 2003). Both approaches rest on
eliminating stationary solutions to sensory-motor dynamics
that involve high-cost states. In sequence learning, this can be
implemented by eliminating withdrawal reflexes using pre-
dictive reflexes that are learned in a self-referenced fashion.
Does this mean active inference makes optimal control redun-
dant? Not necessarily: active-inference simply provides a
larger context, in which optimal policies become prior expec-
tations. It is possible that the brain solves some Bellman equa-
tions to specify optimal expectations (policies) that action
could pursue. Interesting developments in machine learn-
ing speak this notion; “Recently there is growing interest in
using probabilistic inference methods for decision making
and planning. Promising about such approaches is that they
naturally extend to distributed state representations and effi-
ciently cope with uncertainty”; see Toussaint (2009) for a ful-
ler discussion of probabilistic inference as a model of planned
behavior. There are also alternative self-referenced schemes
(e.g., Verschure and Voegtlin 1998; Wörgötter and Porr 2005;
Tschacher and Haken 2007) that may have greater ethologi-
cal and neuronal plausibility. This theme will be developed
further in a forthcoming article on value-learning and free-
energy.
The perspective on optimum policies as prior expectations
may call for a reappraisal of reinforcement learning as an
explanation for behavior and, in particular, the role of dopa-
mine in coding unpredicted reward (Montague et al. 1995;
Schultz et al. 1997; Doya 2002): If dopamine encodes pre-
cision through its classical neuromodulatory effects (cf., Yu
and Dayan 2005) how can this be reconciled with the view
that it encodes prediction error on reward? From a neuro-
biological perspective, it may be that dopamine does not
encode the prediction error of value but the value of predic-
tion error: i.e., the precision of prediction errors that drive
perception and action. If this idea is right, then it speaks to a
symmetry between the role of dopamine in optimizing preci-
sion in anterior (e.g., mesocortical and mesolimbic) systems
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Fig. 16 Schematic highlighting the differences in functional architec-
ture implied by the free-energy formulation and conventional motor
control theories. Both schemes rest on forward and inverse models (i.e.,
internal models) but their nature is fundamentally different. In the free-
energy formulation, action or motor commands are generated through
an inverse model by sensory prediction errors, whereas in conventional
formulations, motor commands are produced by an inverse model that is
driven by inferred and desired states. The red arrows denote ascending
or bottom-up effects and black arrows mean descending or top-down
message passing. The equations in the text boxes indicate the mapping
implicit in the corresponding model
trying to predict proprioceptive and interoceptive sensations
(i.e., value-learning) and the role of acetylcholine in optimiz-
ing hierarchical inference on exteroceptive input in posterior
(e.g., paralimbic and parietal) systems (i.e., attention; Disney
et al. 2007). Furthermore, this perspective on dopaminergic
function fits comfortably with a gating role for dopamine
(O’Reilly et al. 2002) in selecting the percepts that guide
action (Redgrave et al. 1999).
Another interesting aspect of precision is that it covers
generalized motion. This means that action is trying to sup-
press a mixture of [squared] sensory prediction error on posi-
tion, velocity, acceleration, and jerk etc., where the relative
contributions, encoded by µsγ control the smoothness of the
trajectory. This mixture is formally similar to cost-functions
in the motor-control literature that try to account for smooth
motor trajectories that are observed empirically (Todorov and
Jordan 1998; Nakano et al. 1999; Berret et al. 2008).
7.2 Inverse models in motor control
In conventional motor control theory (Wolpert and Miall
1996; Todorov and Jordan 2002; Shadmehr and Krakauer
2008), there are two models, an inverse model and a for-
ward model. The inverse model maps from desired sensory
states to action or motor commands, while the forward model
maps from action to sensory consequences. In order to learn
the inverse model, one needs to evaluate the consequences
of action, which may be sensed with delays and noise. For-
ward models are used to finesse this learning, by provid-
ing surrogate prediction errors (i.e., the difference between
desired sensory consequences and those predicted by the
forward model). However, these forward models are not
generative models of sensory dynamics that are learned in
active inference. There is a fundamental difference between
the functional architecture implied by active inference and
conventional models of motor control (see Fig. 16). In con-
ventional models, action is not driven by sensory predic-
tion error but is specified by a control policy or inverse
model. This inverse model computes the optimum control
for achieving some desired states, which entails inverting
a generative model of how action changes hidden states. In
active inference, the corresponding inverse model determines
how sensory prediction errors influence action. This implicit
inverse model corresponds to the partial derivatives ε˜a in
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Eq. 9, which describes the change in prediction error with
respect to action; i.e., the change in sensory states with action.
In the examples above, we used the true generative process to
compute this mapping (see Eq. A3.3 in Appendix 3). How-
ever, real agents do not have access to the generative process:
Does this mean they have to learn an inverse model as in con-
ventional motor control theories? This is certainly possible;
however, in active inference, the inverse model is much sim-
pler than in conventional formulations, because it maps from
sensations to action, not from hidden states to action (see
Fig. 16). This is important because simple inverse mappings
can be hard-wired by evolution. For example, the mapping
from proprioception to action may be part of classical motor
reflex arcs.
In Fig. 7, the inverse mapping from proprioceptive (e.g.,
stretch receptor) signals to action is simple because specific
alpha and gamma motor neurons stretch specific muscle spin-
dles. In contrast, the mapping between action and visual input
is highly nonlinear and one-to-many. This means that the
inverse mapping from visual prediction error to action is
unlikely to be implemented in the spinal cord, as implied
by the descending black connection in Fig. 7. Would remov-
ing this connection preclude visual input from contributing
to sensorimotor integration? No; the proprioceptive predic-
tions driving action depend on conditional expectations about
hidden states of the body, and these expectations depend
on vision (they explain away visual prediction error). This
means that sensory prediction errors in all modalities can
affect proprioceptive predictions through conditional expec-
tations about the deployment and trajectory of the motor
plant. This key interplay between action and perception will
be the subject of a future article.
In short, the free-energy formulation replaces an inverse
model, mapping from inferred states of the world to action,
with the inversion of a much simpler mapping between action
and sensory consequences. This may be one way of under-
standing the prevalence of retinotopic maps (such as those
in the superficial and deep layers of the superior collicu-
lus), which enable changes in sensory input with small eye
movements to be inverted quickly and simply. The mapping
between action and proprioception is even simpler: Motor
neuron discharges in the ventral horn cause muscle spindles
to contract and change sensory prediction errors in dorsal
horn cells through classical motor reflex arcs (see Fig. 1). The
argument here is that action changes proprioceptive predic-
tion errors in a stereotyped and simple way. This may enable
the inverse mapping to be specified epigenetically in periphe-
ralorsubcortical systemsandconservedovercontextandphy-
logeny. The advantages of feedback control at the peripheral
(e.g., spinal) level include robustness to noise or incomplete
specification of the inverse model (Wolpert and Miall 1996).
Furthermore, generating command signals in the periphery
finesses many problems induced by temporal delays.
7.3 Forward models in motor control
In the free-energy formulation, recognition proceeds by
inversion of a generative or forward model mapping from
hidden states to sensations. In conventional motor control,
the forward model is used to generate predicted sensory con-
sequences of action. These ensuing sensory prediction errors
are used in state-estimation and as teaching signals to opti-
mize the inverse model or control policy. The mechanisms
of this estimation and learning vary but are formally related
to perceptual inference and learning (e.g., Kalman filtering
and associative plasticity); however, conventional schemes
only represent states, as opposed to the trajectories implicit
in generalized coordinates, which renders them sensitive to
temporal delays.
The key difference is that forward models in conventional
motor control include the effects of action whereas, forward
models in active inference do not. Action is not part of infer-
ence (i.e., inversion of a generative model) because it is a
known quantity; action is just there to explain away unex-
pected sensory prediction errors. This does not mean that
agents cannot learn about their motor plant. Indeed, the motor
plant is probably one of the most important aspects of the
environment for predicting sensory input (see Grafton and
Hamilton 2007). This may be reflected in the preoccupation
of infants with moving their limbs (and the role of rattles in
promoting multimodal learning). However, generative mod-
els of the motor plant are not conventional forward models
of motor control, because they map from causes to conse-
quences (not action to consequences). In other words, gen-
erative models allow exogenous causes of movement to be
perceived but not action per se (imagine a percept of action
in the absence of sensations).
7.4 Efference copy and corollary discharge
In modern treatments, efference copy refers to a copy of
the signals from the control policy (inverse) model that are
passed to the forward model to create corollary discharge sig-
nals (predicted sensory consequences of action; see Fig. 16
and Wolpert and Miall 1996). Corollary discharge is then
used to explain sensory input that can be attributed to action
(reafference). This enables the consequences of exogenous
influences (exafference) to be isolated. An example in lower
vertebrates is seen in electric fish (Bell and Grant 1989),
which send top-down corollary discharges to inhibit ascend-
ing sensory pathways. This allows the fish to disambiguate
between self-generated electric organ discharges and those
from other fish. However, in the free-energy formulation,
there is no need to remove the sensory consequences of action
because action is only there to explain away sensory predic-
tion errors. In the free-energy scheme, efference copy and
corollary discharge are simply the bottom-up and top-down
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signals that mediate perception. In other words, corollary dis-
charge can be understood as top-down predictions that inhibit
ascending sensory pathways by explaining away sensory pre-
diction error. Conversely, sensory prediction error units send
top-down signals to motor control units and ascending pre-
diction errors (efference copy) to optimize predictions (see
Fig. 16). If this interpretation of efference copy and corol-
lary discharge holds, then it highlights again the intimate
relationship between action and perception. A relationship
that is highlighted by formulations of the equilibrium-point
hypothesis, which suggest “action and perception are accom-
plished in a common spatial frame of reference” (Feldman
2009).
7.5 The equilibrium-point hypothesis
The equilibrium-point hypothesis (Feldman and Levin 1995)
suggests that movement is not controlled directly by the cen-
tral nervous system but by top-down signals that supply the
final point of a movement (in terms of the lengths of ten-
sor and extensor muscles). In this model, muscles and the
peripheral nervous system accommodate un-modeled forces
and viscosity automatically. This is closely related to the
current formulation, in which movements are prescribed by
top-down predictions and peripheral systems respond by
suppressing prediction error. Under the equilibrium-point
hypothesis, these predictions correspond to sensory input at
the equilibrium point. Under active inference, the predictions
are of the sensory trajectories that lead to the equilibrium
point. This difference is crucial, because it might account for
some difficulties with the equilibrium-point hypothesis: for
example, in explaining fast movements and overshoots.
Clearly, we have not touched on the detailed physiology
or mechanistic issues that are addressed by conventional ef-
ference copy or equilibrium-point models. However, the for-
mulation of sensory prediction error in terms of trajectories
(i.e., in generalized coordinates of motion) may be useful
for movement specification in terms of fixed-point attractors.
Generalized coordinates mean that movements are specified
as predicted trajectories, which include speed, acceleration,
jerk etc. This resolves some of the difficulties encountered
when considering neuronal propagation delays or unpredict-
ed changes in force or viscosity. In particular, it addresses
the challenge posed to the equilibrium-point hypothesis: “A
theory of movement should offer insight into why we make
movements the way we do and why we activate muscles
in particular patterns” (Gottlieb 1998). It is interesting to
note that recent equilibrium-point formulations focus on the
(coordinate) frames of reference that enable anticipation and
prediction: “Experimental data also imply that once a frame
of reference is chosen, its attributes are modified in a feed-
forward way, thus enabling the brain to act in an anticipatory
and predictive manner” (Feldman 2009).
7.6 Dynamic systems and optimal control
Generative models in the free-energy formulation are per-
ceptual models that preclude action as a potential cause of
sensory perturbations. Action per se is used to suppress unex-
plained prediction errors. This means that, from the point
of view of the agent, there is no difference between nav-
igating in a controlled and uncontrolled environment; the
agent does not know that the expected sensory trajectories
are being caused by its own action; it experiences the world
as if it were delivering predicable streams of sensory input.
This perspective could reconcile some differences between
dynamic systems and optimal control treatments of computa-
tional motor control: “The dynamic system approach empha-
sizes motor control as a process of self-organization between
an animal and its environment. … In contrast, optimal control
approaches view motor control as the evolutionary or devel-
opment result of a nervous system that tries to optimize rather
general organizational principles” (see Schaal et al. 2007). In
active inference, recognition dynamics optimize free-energy:
i.e., self-organizing dynamical exchanges with the environ-
ment that optimizes neural processes and connectivity under
a general free-energy principle. Crucially, free-energy and
surprise rest on prior expectations, which can only be opti-
mized by evolutionary or developmental processes.
8 Conclusion
In summary, we have shown how the free-energy principle
can be motivated from the need for agents to maintain their
exchange with the environment in equilibrium. We have con-
sidered behavior that would emerge under this principle and
have shown how it can be harnessed to optimize policies usu-
ally addressed with optimum control theory. Underpinning
this study is a unifying approach to action and perception:
perceptual learning and inference is necessary to induce prior
expectations about the sensorium and action is engaged to
resample the world to fulfill these expectations. This places
perception and action in intimate relation and accounts for
the both with the same principle. Furthermore, this principle
can be implemented in a simple and biologically plausible
fashion. The same scheme used in this article has been used
to simulate a range of biological processes: ranging from
perceptual categorization of bird-song (Kiebel et al. 2008)
to perceptual learning during the mismatch negativity para-
digm (Friston et al. 2006). Furthermore, all the simulations
in those cited articles and in this article use just one Matlab
routine (see Appendix 3). If these ideas are valid, then they
speak to a fundamental role for perception in action (Wolpert
et al. 1995; Shadmehr and Krakauer 2008; Bays and Wolpert
2007; Tseng et al. 2007; Wei and Körding 2009).
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Here, we show why the entropy of hidden states is bounded
by the entropy of sensory states and a sensory mapping term.
We then discuss why the minimizing sensory entropy is suf-
ficient to reduce the entropy of hidden states. The sensory
states s˜ ∈ S are an additive mixture of a function of the hid-
den states x˜ ∈ X plus some generalized random fluctuations
s˜ = g(x˜, θ) + z˜ (A1.1)
Because x˜ and z˜ ∈ Z are statistically independent, we have
(Eq. 6.4.6 in Jones 1979, p. 149)
I (S, Z) = H(S|m) − H(S|Z , m)
= H(S|m) − H(X |m) −
∫
p(x˜ |m) ln |gx˜ |dx˜
(A1.2)
Here and below a subscript denotes differentiation: i.e., gx :=
∂x g. In (A1.1) I (S, Z) = D(p(s˜, z˜|m)||p(s˜|m)p(z˜)) ≥ 0
is the mutual information between the sensory states and
noise. This non-negative cross-entropy or Kullback–Leibler
divergence (see Theorem 6.5; Jones 1979, p. 151) means
the entropy of the sensory states is always greater than the
entropy of the sensory map of hidden states
H(S|m) ≥ H(X |m) +
∫
p(x˜ |m) ln |gx˜ |dx˜ (A1.3)
The gradient gx˜ is of the sensory mapping with respect to
the hidden states. The integral n (A1.3) reflects the fact that
entropy is not invariant to a change of variables and rests
on the assumption that the sensory mapping g : X → S is
diffeomorphic. This assumption could be considered as a pre-
diction that sensory mappings must be diffeomorphic (i.e.,
bijective and smooth). A diffeomorphism requires the dimen-
sionality of the hidden and sensory state–spaces to be equal.
This is assured by the fact we are dealing with generalized
states that can be truncated at any arbitrarily high order. For
example, if we had n hidden states in m generalized coor-
dinates motion, then we would consider m sensory states in
n generalized coordinates, such that dim(x˜) = dim(s˜) =
n × m. Finally, rearranging (A1.3) gives Eq. 1 in the main
text.
Minimizing sensory entropy
Because entropy is not invariant under a change of variables,
the sensory mapping is a key determinant of sensory entropy.
Note that agents cannot change the mapping per se; they can
only change the hidden states that are mapped to sensory
input. However, the astute reader will note that nonlineari-
ties in the sensory mapping mean that changing some hidden
states will affect the sensory mapping of others (e.g., clos-
ing ones eyes). Does this mean that sensory entropy can be
suppressed by simply avoiding sensory input? No—because
entropy is conditioned on the agent (it is the average sur-
prise given a particular agent). Agents who are not surprised
by the absence of sensations are unlikely to exist because
they are unable to navigate the environment and maintain
an equilibrium density. This argument is at the heart of the
free-energy formulation and appeals to the same tautology
as adaptive fitness in natural selection. In the present con-
text, it suggests that sensory channels that are critical for
survival should be privileged and cannot be occluded (e.g.,
nociceptive pain signals and interoception signaling hunger,
thirst etc.). Second, it suggests that agents should find the
absence of sensory information surprising. We develop this
theme in more detail in the context of value-learning (Friston
et al., in preparation). In brief, prior expectations (cf. optimal
policies) about the trajectories of hidden states induce explo-
ration and sampling of the environment. These priors are part
of the model on which entropy is conditioned, which reduce
the entropy of hidden states. This reduces sensory entropy,
which is a lower bound on free-energy. Put simply, the free-
energy formulation assumes that agents have the right priors.
This assumption cannot be violated, because agents who do
not have the right priors cannot exist.
Appendix 2
Here, we derive the various formations of free-energy and
show how they relate to each other. We start with the quantity
we want to bound: namely, surprise or log-evidence associ-
ated with some sensory states s˜ that have been caused by some
unknown quantities  (dropping conditional dependency on
model m for clarity)
− ln p(s˜) = − ln
∫
p(s˜, )d (A2.1)
We now simply add a non-negative cross-entropy or diver-
gence between some arbitrary (recognition) density q() :=
q(|µ) and the posterior density p(|s˜) to create a free-
energy bound on surprise





= − ln p(s˜) + D(q()||p(|s˜)) (A2.2)
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Fig. 17 Schematic summary of
the relationships among the
various energies that participate
in the free-energy formulation.
The right hand panel shows that
free-energy upper bounds
sensory surprise, which in turn
bounds implicit surprise about
hidden states of the world (under
some simplifying assumptions).
These bounding relationships
are assured by the divergences
that separate them, which are
(by construction) non-negative.
The associated time or
path-integrals of the energies are
shown on the left. These are
called ‘actions’ and are formally
equivalent to entropy (i.e.,
average surprise). See Appendix
2 for a more detailed discussion
The cross entropy term is non-negative by Gibb’s inequal-
ity. Because surprise depends only on sensory states, we can
bring it inside the integral and use p(, s˜) = p(|s˜)p(s˜) to
show free-energy is the Gibb’s energy − ln p(, s˜) expected














q() ln p(, s˜)d +
∫
q() ln q()d
= −〈ln p(, s˜)〉q + 〈ln q()〉q (A2.3)
A final rearrangement, using p(, s˜) = p(s˜|)p(), shows
that free-energy is also complexity minus accuracy, where
complexity is the divergence between the recognition den-














= −〈ln p(s˜|)〉q + D(q()||p()) (A2.4)
Equations (A2.2), (A2.3) and (A2.4) are the three formula-
tions used in the main text. Figure 17 provides a graphical
summary of these relationships.
Appendix 3
The simulations in this article involve integrating time-vary-
ing states in both the environment and the agent as a single

































In order to update these states, we use a local linearization:
u = (exp(t)− I )(t)−1u˙ over time steps of t , where
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The conditional expectations of the parameters and preci-
sions are updated after every simulated trail as described
in Friston (2008). Equation A3.2 may look complicated but
can be evaluated automatically using numerical derivatives.
All the simulations in this article used just one routine—
spm_ADEM.m. Demonstrations of this scheme are available
as part of the SPM software (http://www.fil.ion.ion.ucl.ac.
uk/spm; DEM_demo.m), and reproduce the examples in the
main text.
In order to include action in the free-energy scheme, we
simply add action to the states of the generative process pro-
ducing sensory data and specify its dynamics as a gradi-
ent descent on free-energy. Because action can only affect
the free-energy through the sensory data that are sampled,
it can only affect sensory prediction error. Therefore, action
dynamics are prescribed by







The partial derivative of the error with respect to action
is the partial derivative of the sensory data with respect to
action and is specified by the generative process. In biolog-
ically plausible instances of this scheme, this partial deriva-
tive would have to be computed on the basis of a mapping
from action to sensory consequences (see Sect. 7). One might
assume that this mapping was sufficiently simple to be hard-
wired or, when dependent upon sensory states, was based on
some interpolation or Gaussian process model. This will be
demonstrated in future simulations.
Note that (A3.1) is formulated in generalized coordinates
of motion. Although there is no need to express action in
generalized coordinates (because it is real-world state), it can
change the high-order motion of other environmental states.
For example, in the mountain-car system, action changes the
second-order motion of position (i.e., acceleration) and plays
the role of a Newtonian force.
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